Company Can’t Pay Its Debts? A Director’s Step-by-Step Guide Before Formal Insolvency

If the bank statement no longer covers payroll, HMRC has gone quiet, or a creditor is talking about a winding-up petition — every director has the same instinct: pick up the phone to an insolvency practitioner and hand the problem over. That instinct is often premature, almost always expensive, and frequently cuts off options the director never knew they had.

This guide walks through the steps an unrepresented director can take before a formal insolvency procedure starts — informed by the Insolvency Act 1986, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, the Statements of Insolvency Practice (SIPs), and HMRC’s published Time to Pay framework. None of what follows is legal advice; it is procedural literacy, written so that the people who actually run the company stay in the driving seat for as long as the law permits.

The duty that changes the moment trouble starts

Under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, a director’s duty is normally owed to the shareholders. The moment the company is, or is likely to become, insolvent, that duty shifts to the company’s creditors. This is not a soft principle — it is the foundation for wrongful trading liability under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, where directors who keep trading while there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation can be held personally liable.

What this means in practice: the moment serious cashflow stress appears, document the decisions. Board minutes that record the analysis (“we considered options A, B, C and pursued B for these reasons”), forecasts updated weekly, and a clear paper trail of attempts to preserve creditor value are what later separate a careful director from one exposed to a misfeasance claim.

Step 1 — Build a 13-week cashflow forecast first

Every conversation with a creditor, lender, IP, or court will begin with the same question: how much money is coming in, how much is going out, and on what dates? Without a 13-week direct cashflow forecast, the director is negotiating blind. With one, the director controls the narrative.

The forecast should be week-by-week, line-item by line-item: payroll dates, VAT and PAYE liabilities, rent, key supplier invoices, expected receipts (with realistic conversion probabilities, not invoice face value). Most companies that engage an IP have never built one; the IP then builds it for them and bills for it.

Step 2 — Apply for HMRC Time to Pay directly

For many companies, HMRC is the largest unsecured creditor by a long way. HMRC’s Time to Pay (TTP) framework allows a phased payment plan for VAT, PAYE, Corporation Tax and Self Assessment. The application is made directly by the director — no intermediary required — through the Business Payment Support Service.

The director needs the 13-week forecast, an explanation of the cause of difficulty, the proposed monthly instalment, and confirmation that all returns are filed. Plans are commonly agreed for 6–12 months, occasionally longer. Interest accrues but enforcement pauses while the plan is in good standing.

A successful TTP arrangement removes the most aggressive creditor from the threat board and buys the company the time to pursue Steps 3–8 below.

Step 3 — Negotiate an informal creditor moratorium

Outside any statutory framework, directors can write to key trade creditors proposing a standstill: continued trading, payment of going-forward invoices on terms, and a deferred schedule for the historic balance. This is a director-led negotiation. It depends on whether the creditor would prefer an orderly recovery to a liquidation dividend, and the answer is usually yes — particularly where the trading relationship has value.

A clear letter, a copy of the cashflow forecast, and a specific proposal (not a vague request for “patience”) is far more persuasive than silence followed by enforcement. An informal moratorium has no statutory protection — a creditor can still petition — but in practice most will engage if the alternative is a write-off.

Step 4 — Consider a Part A1 statutory moratorium (CIGA 2020)

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 introduced a free-standing moratorium under Part A1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 — typically 20 business days, extendable. During the moratorium, most creditor enforcement is paused, including winding-up petitions, while directors continue to run the company under the supervision of a “monitor” (a licensed IP).

Critically, the directors stay in control. The moratorium is the most director-friendly statutory tool the UK has introduced in a generation. It is under-used, and many companies that end up in administration could have stabilised under Part A1 first.

Step 5 — Draft the CVA proposal yourself

A Company Voluntary Arrangement under Part I of the Insolvency Act 1986 binds creditors to a compromise (typically a percentage payment over 3–5 years) if 75% by value of voting unsecured creditors approve. A CVA needs a nominee IP (who becomes the supervisor) — but the proposal itself, the engine of the whole arrangement, is a directors’ document.

The proposal must set out the company’s history, the cause of difficulty, a creditor schedule, the comparative outcome statement (what creditors would receive in liquidation versus the CVA), the dividend timetable, and the monitoring mechanism. A director who arrives with a draft proposal — even an imperfect one — sets the agenda. A director who arrives empty-handed is billed by the IP for every paragraph.

The full CVA structure is set out in our company voluntary arrangement guide, and the CVA self-help drafting guide walks through every component of the proposal a director can produce themselves — often the difference between a £50,000 IP bill and a £5,000-£15,000 nominee/supervisor fee. The insolvency forms hub covers every related procedure.

Step 6 — If the company is solvent: Members’ Voluntary Liquidation

If the company is actually solvent — assets cover liabilities and the directors can sign a declaration of solvency — a Members’ Voluntary Liquidation closes the company tax-efficiently under section 84 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The director’s task is to ensure the declaration is accurate (false declarations carry criminal penalties under section 89(4)) and that the liquidator’s fees are agreed in writing under SIP 9 before the appointment, not after.

Step 7 — Choosing the IP, on the director’s terms

When a formal procedure is unavoidable, the director chooses the IP — not the bank, not the landlord, not the creditor making the loudest noise. Three practical filters:

• Independence. Ask in writing about any prior relationship with the company’s secured creditors, key suppliers, or referrers. The Insolvency Code of Ethics requires disclosure; a clean answer is documented, not assumed.
• SIP 9 fee transparency. Before appointment, ask for the fee estimate, the basis (fixed, percentage, or time-cost), the staff grade rates, and the expected disbursements. SIP 9 requires this disclosure. Refusing to provide it before appointment is a red flag.
• Regulatory standing. Every IP is licensed by a recognised professional body — ICAEW, ACCA, IPA, the Law Society. The IP’s licence number and RPB are public. A search on the Insolvency Service register confirms standing in moments.

Get two or three written proposals. Compare fee estimates. Ask each IP how they would treat the company’s particular facts. The variance between IP fee proposals on the same case routinely runs into five figures. A company in distress cannot afford not to ask.

Step 8 — Pre-pack: useful, scrutinised, document the marketing

A pre-packaged administration sale can preserve trade and jobs where a slow process would destroy both. It is also the procedure most associated with director self-dealing concerns, which is why SIP 16 and the Pre-Pack Pool now require disclosed marketing and (for connected- party sales) an independent evaluator’s report under the Administration (Restrictions on Disposal etc. to Connected Persons) Regulations 2021.

Used properly, a pre-pack is legitimate and well-understood. Used badly, it produces the “phoenix” pattern that draws Insolvency Service investigation. Directors who are considering a connected-party purchase should commission the evaluator report early, document the marketing process exhaustively, and assume every step will be examined.

Step 9 — Part 26A Restructuring Plan

Introduced by CIGA 2020 and inserted into the Companies Act 2006 as Part 26A, a Restructuring Plan can bind dissenting creditor classes through cross-class cram-down — a tool not available in a CVA. It is court-supervised, requires expert evidence on the relevant alternative, and is expensive: typically suited to mid-market companies with complex capital structures. Where it fits, it preserves more value than any alternative.

Step 10 — Records, records, records

Every step above leaves a paper trail. Board minutes that record the analysis. Cashflow forecasts updated weekly. Correspondence with creditors. Engagement letters with professionals. Disclosure under SIP 9. The director who emerges from a difficult period with a clean, contemporaneous record has the strongest defence to any later wrongful-trading claim under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The director who reconstructs the record in hindsight has the weakest.

Why this matters: the cost of giving up control too early

The honest position: insolvency practitioners are necessary for any formal procedure. Many do excellent work and protect creditor value carefully. The system as a whole is not the problem.

The problem is asymmetry. Directors arrive frightened, under time pressure, often having spoken to one IP through a referral, and frequently unaware of Steps 1 through 9. They sign engagement letters they have not negotiated, accept fee structures they have not benchmarked, and forfeit director-led options they could have run themselves. By the time they understand the procedure, the procedure is them.

How Chris drafts the documents

Most of the steps above turn on documents: the cashflow narrative, the HMRC Time to Pay letter, the standstill proposal to creditors, the directors’ resolution, the CVA proposal, the SIP 9 information request to a prospective IP, the engagement-letter mark-up.

Chris drafts each of these to the standard a court — or a creditor’s solicitor — would expect. Tell Chris the company’s facts, upload the management accounts and recent correspondence, and he produces the full document set in minutes, with cross-references to the relevant statutory provisions and SIPs. We work under an aggregated model that gathers data for your cases. Your data — your chat — is archived and never viewed by another human.

Related procedural guides

• Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) — Step-by-step guide
• CVA self-help drafting guide — cut £20k-£50k IP fees
• Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) — Director’s guide
• Members’ Voluntary Liquidation (MVL) — Solvent closure
• Winding-up petition — How to defend or present
• Statutory demand — Form SD response
• Director disqualification defence (CDDA 1986)
• Pre-pack administration — SIP 16 and the Evaluator
• DIY CVA & Insolvency Toolkit — every HMCTS form
• Phoenix strategy & Part A1 moratorium — property carve-out warning
• All insolvency & debt forms — full hub

This guide is procedural literacy, not legal advice. Insolvency carries personal director liability under sections 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986; complex situations should be reviewed by a qualified insolvency practitioner or solicitor before formal steps are taken. The role of this guide is to make sure the director understands the options before that conversation, not to replace it.

When liquidation is the right answer — and when it is not

The companion guide above maps the rescue toolkit: time to pay, informal standstills, the Part A1 moratorium, a CVA, a restructuring plan. Those should be exhausted first. But there comes a point where the honest conclusion is that the company has no reasonable prospect of trading out, the deficit to creditors is widening, and continuing to trade would expose the directors personally. At that point the right answer is an orderly winding-up — and doing it deliberately, with a clean record, is itself an act of director protection. Liquidation is not the right route where the business is fundamentally viable and the problem is a temporary cash squeeze (use the rescue tools), where the company is solvent and simply being closed (that is a members’ voluntary liquidation, a different procedure), or where a creditor is bluffing with a statutory demand the company genuinely disputes (that may be defended, not capitulated to). Choosing the wrong procedure is one of the most expensive mistakes a frightened director makes.

The three winding-up routes compared

“Winding-up” and “liquidation” mean the same thing — the formal process of realising a company’s assets, paying creditors in the statutory order and dissolving the company. There are three routes, and they turn entirely on the company’s solvency and on who starts the process.

Feature	MVL — Members’ Voluntary Liquidation	CVL — Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation	Compulsory Winding-Up
Solvency position	Solvent — assets exceed liabilities; all debts paid within 12 months	Insolvent — cannot pay debts as they fall due, or liabilities exceed assets	Insolvent — usually proven by an unpaid statutory demand or judgment debt
Who initiates	The company / shareholders	The company / shareholders (with creditors choosing the liquidator)	A creditor, the company, a director, or the Secretary of State, by petition to court
The trigger	A signed declaration of solvency (IA 1986 s.89)	A shareholders’ resolution to wind up because of insolvency (IA 1986 s.84)	A court winding-up order on a petition (IA 1986 s.122, ground (f): unable to pay debts, s.123)
Key statutory route	IA 1986 Part IV, Chapter III (members’ voluntary)	IA 1986 Part IV, Chapter IV (creditors’ voluntary)	IA 1986 Part IV, Chapter VI (winding-up by the court)
Who controls the choice of office-holder	Shareholders	Creditors (by value) override the shareholders’ choice	The court appoints; the Official Receiver acts initially
Typical outcome	Tax-efficient solvent closure; surplus returned to shareholders	Director-led orderly insolvent closure; liquidator investigates and reports	Court-driven insolvent closure; greater scrutiny, less director control

The strategic point: a CVL is the director-controlled insolvent route. If the company drifts and a creditor petitions first, the same company is wound up compulsorily — later, more publicly, with the Official Receiver in charge and the director’s influence over timing, narrative and choice of practitioner largely gone. Moving deliberately into a CVL while you still can is almost always better for the director than waiting to be pushed into compulsory liquidation.

The full CVL process, step by step

1. The board resolves and instructs a practitioner

The directors hold a board meeting and resolve that the company is insolvent and should be wound up, and that a licensed insolvency practitioner be instructed to assist with convening the members’ and creditors’ decisions. This board minute is the foundation document. It should record the financial analysis, the options considered and rejected, and the reasoning — because it is the contemporaneous evidence that later answers any question about whether the directors acted properly. A licensed IP is legally required to act as liquidator (IA 1986 s.388–390 define and reserve the role of insolvency practitioner), but the board minute itself is a director’s document you can prepare to a high standard before you pick up the phone.

2. The members’ resolution to wind up

The shareholders pass a resolution to wind the company up voluntarily under IA 1986 s.84. Because the company is insolvent, this is the creditors’ voluntary route, and the resolution is ordinarily a special resolution (75% of votes cast) or as the articles require. The members may nominate a liquidator, but that nomination is provisional — the creditors have the final say.

3. The creditors’ decision procedure

Under the Insolvency Rules 2016, creditors no longer have to attend a physical meeting by default. The liquidator’s appointment and other matters are decided through a decision procedure — commonly correspondence (a deemed-consent or virtual decision), or a virtual meeting — with a physical meeting only required if a sufficient threshold of creditors requests one. The relevant machinery sits in IR 2016 Part 15 (decision making) and Part 6 (the rules specific to creditors’ voluntary winding-up). For a decision by correspondence and most ordinary resolutions, the test is a simple majority in value of those creditors voting; the director should not assume a head-count majority is what matters — in insolvency, value almost always governs.

4. The decision date and the statement of affairs

The directors must deliver a statement of affairs to creditors — a sworn or signed statement setting out the company’s assets at estimated realisable value, its liabilities (preferential, secured and unsecured), and the resulting deficiency. The statement of affairs requirement for a creditors’ voluntary winding-up flows from IA 1986 s.99 and the prescribed content in the Insolvency Rules 2016. It is accompanied by a deficiency account explaining how the shortfall arose. This is the single document creditors scrutinise most closely, and the narrative around it — the directors’ explanation of the company’s history and the cause of failure — is exactly the kind of director-led groundwork that, prepared well in advance, saves substantial practitioner time.

5. Appointment and the creditors’ committee

Once the creditors’ decision confirms the liquidator, the liquidator is appointed and takes office. Creditors may also establish a liquidation (creditors’) committee to assist and oversee the liquidator. From appointment, the directors’ powers cease, custody of the company’s property and records passes to the liquidator, and the directors’ role becomes one of cooperation: delivering up records, completing the statement of affairs and answering the liquidator’s enquiries.

The statutory framework you are operating inside

Two instruments govern almost everything here. The Insolvency Act 1986 sets the substantive law: Part IV covers winding-up of companies (the three routes above); s.84 the resolution to wind up; s.89 and s.99 the solvency declaration and statement of affairs; s.107 the principle that, subject to preferential and secured claims, the assets are distributed pari passu (equally, in proportion) among unsecured creditors; and s.388–390 reserve the office of liquidator to licensed insolvency practitioners. The Insolvency Rules 2016 supply the procedure: Part 6 for creditors’ voluntary winding-up, Part 14 for claims and proofs of debt, and Part 15 for decision procedures and creditor voting. Knowing which instrument answers a question — substance to the Act, procedure to the Rules — is half of looking organised in front of a practitioner or a court.

Director duties and personal risk — the part that should focus the mind

The duty shift is the hinge of everything. As the companion guide notes, once a company is or is likely to become insolvent, the directors’ duty to promote the success of the company for the members reorients toward the interests of creditors. From that moment, several personal-liability and disqualification risks come live. A director who understands them — and documents accordingly — is protecting themselves; a director who does not is walking blind into the liquidator’s investigation.

Wrongful trading — IA 1986 s.214

If, before the winding-up, a director knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, and did not take every step to minimise loss to creditors, the court may order that director to contribute personally to the company’s assets. The defence is not optimism — it is a contemporaneous record showing the director took every reasonable step once the writing was on the wall. This is precisely why the board minutes and forecasts matter.

Misfeasance — IA 1986 s.212

A summary mechanism allowing the liquidator (or a creditor) to bring a director who has misapplied or retained company money, or breached a fiduciary duty, to account. It is the procedural gateway through which many director breaches are pursued in a liquidation.

Transactions at an undervalue — IA 1986 s.238

If, within the relevant look-back period before the onset of insolvency, the company gave away an asset or sold it for significantly less than its worth, the liquidator can apply to court to unwind the transaction. Selling the company van to a relative for a nominal sum on the eve of liquidation is the classic trap.

Preferences — IA 1986 s.239

If the company, influenced by a desire to prefer, put a particular creditor in a better position than they would otherwise have been in — for example, repaying a director’s loan or a debt personally guaranteed by the director, ahead of ordinary trade creditors — the liquidator can apply to have it reversed. The look-back period is longer for connected persons. This is one of the most common ways well-meaning directors create personal liability in the final weeks.

Director disqualification — CDDA 1986

In every insolvent liquidation, the liquidator must submit a conduct report on each person who was a director in the relevant period. Under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, conduct found to make a person unfit can lead to a disqualification order or undertaking, typically for a period of years, barring them from acting as a director. Cooperation, candour and a clean record are the director’s best protection.

Costs — and how a prepared director cuts them

A liquidator’s fee is driven by the time the case takes. Much of that time is spent assembling information the directors hold but have not organised: the asset and creditor schedules, the statement of affairs, the history of the company, the explanation of the deficiency. The more of that the director arrives with — accurate, complete and properly drafted — the less the practitioner has to reconstruct, and the lower the cost falls on the estate.

Task	Who must do it	Can the director self-prepare?
Acting as liquidator / office-holder	A licensed insolvency practitioner — legally reserved (IA 1986 s.388–390)	No
Convening the formal creditors’ decision	Carried out by / through the practitioner	No — but you can prepare the underlying information
Board minute resolving to wind up	The directors	Yes — draft to a high standard in advance
Statement of affairs & deficiency narrative	The directors provide it (verified)	Yes — gather and draft the substance; the practitioner finalises the prescribed form
Creditor correspondence & the failure narrative	The directors	Yes
Responding to a statutory demand or petition	The directors / company	Yes — draft the response; take advice on disputed claims

The wedge is simple and honest: eLitigant does not and cannot act as the liquidator. What it does is help the director produce the “director’s half” of the file — to a standard that means the practitioner spends time on judgement, not transcription. Always check the current statutory deposit and any court fee figures before you rely on them — these change.

Timelines, employees, assets, leases and contracts

A CVL can move from board decision to liquidator appointment in a short window — often a couple of weeks — once the paperwork is ready; that readiness is exactly what the director controls. On appointment:

• Employees — their contracts usually terminate on or around the liquidation. Employees become preferential creditors for certain arrears within statutory limits, and can claim statutory entitlements (redundancy pay, notice pay, arrears of wages and holiday pay) from the Redundancy Payments Service, subject to the statutory caps and qualifying conditions. The exact weekly caps and limits change each year — check the current figures.
• Assets — pass into the liquidator’s control to be realised for creditors, subject to valid security and retention-of-title claims.
• Leases and contracts — the liquidator may disclaim onerous property, including unprofitable leases, under the Insolvency Act 1986’s disclaimer provisions; landlords and counterparties then prove for their loss as creditors.
• Personal guarantees — survive the company. A director who guaranteed a company debt remains personally liable on the guarantee after the company is wound up; this is a critical, frequently-missed point.

After liquidation: dissolution, the conduct report and bona vacantia

When the liquidator has realised the assets, distributed to creditors in the statutory order and completed the formalities, the company is dissolved — it ceases to exist as a legal entity, typically a set period after the liquidator’s final account and notice to Companies House. Two things outlast it. First, the liquidator’s conduct report on the directors will already have gone to the Insolvency Service. Second, any property still held by the company at dissolution passes to the Crown as bona vacantia (“ownerless goods”) — which is why leaving assets, cash or even a positive bank balance in a company that is then dissolved is a costly oversight.

Common, costly mistakes

• Repaying yourself or a guaranteed creditor first. The classic preference under s.239 — it can be reversed and it colours the conduct report.
• Selling assets cheaply to a connected party. A transaction at an undervalue under s.238, scrutinised hard where the buyer is connected.
• Trading on in hope without a record. Wrongful trading exposure under s.214 turns on whether you documented the steps you took once recovery was no longer realistic.
• Waiting to be petitioned. Drifting into compulsory winding-up forfeits the director control a deliberate CVL preserves.
• Treating the statement of affairs as a form-filling chore. It is the document creditors and the liquidator read first; an inaccurate or thin one invites suspicion.
• Forgetting personal guarantees. They survive the liquidation; plan for them separately.
• Leaving assets in the company at dissolution. They vanish to the Crown as bona vacantia.

Choosing an insolvency practitioner — and keeping fees down

A formal liquidation or Company Voluntary Arrangement legally needs a licensed insolvency practitioner — but you can prepare and draft most of the groundwork yourself first (the directors’ statement of affairs, the background, the proposal narrative), which is where the real fee savings are. If you do appoint one, consider a smaller, local, independent practitioner rather than a large national firm: you typically get more personal service, clearer communication, fewer conflicts of interest and more competitive fees — and you deal directly with the person handling your case, not a production line. Always ask for a written fee estimate and check the practitioner’s regulatory record with their licensing body before you appoint.

If a regulated adviser lets you down

Most insolvency practitioners act properly, but if one treats you unfairly you can complain about them for free — and if a public body or the NHS is involved, see the PHSO complaint guide.

Frequently asked questions

Do I legally have to use an insolvency practitioner to liquidate my company?

Yes, for a formal liquidation. The office of liquidator is reserved by the Insolvency Act 1986 (s.388–390) to licensed insolvency practitioners. What you can do yourself is prepare the director’s groundwork — the board minutes, the statement of affairs substance, the creditor correspondence — so the practitioner’s time, and therefore the cost, is reduced.

What is the difference between a CVL and compulsory liquidation?

A CVL is started by the company itself — the shareholders resolve to wind up and the creditors choose the liquidator. Compulsory liquidation is imposed by a court winding-up order, usually on a creditor’s petition, with the Official Receiver acting first. The CVL keeps the director in control of timing and choice of practitioner; the compulsory route does not.

What majority do creditors need to appoint the liquidator?

Decisions in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up are made through a decision procedure under the Insolvency Rules 2016, and ordinary resolutions are decided by a majority in value of the creditors who vote, not by head count. Where creditors’ and members’ nominations differ, the creditors’ choice generally prevails.

Can I be made personally liable for the company’s debts?

The company’s ordinary trade debts are the company’s, not yours — that is the point of limited liability. But personal exposure can arise from wrongful trading (s.214), misfeasance (s.212), preferences (s.239), transactions at undervalue (s.238), or a personal guarantee you signed. A clean contemporaneous record is the best defence to the first four; the last survives the liquidation regardless. If guarantee or other personal debts then fall on you, know the personal enforcement landscape too: a judgment creditor can apply for an attachment of earnings order on Form N337 against your income, or escalate to a bankruptcy petition; a negotiated IVA proposal can settle personal debts before either lands.

What happens to my employees?

Their contracts usually end on the liquidation, and they can claim statutory entitlements — redundancy pay, notice pay, unpaid wages and holiday pay — from the Redundancy Payments Service, within statutory caps that change each year. They also rank as preferential creditors for certain arrears.

What is a statement of affairs and who prepares it?

It is the formal schedule of the company’s assets (at estimated realisable value) and liabilities, with a deficiency account explaining the shortfall, required in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up under IA 1986 s.99. The directors must provide and verify it. Drafting its substance and the failure narrative well in advance is one of the highest-value things a director can self-prepare.

I’ve received a statutory demand or a winding-up petition — is it too late?

Not necessarily. A statutory demand for a genuinely disputed debt can be challenged rather than paid, and a petition can sometimes be opposed. But the clock matters: once a petition is advertised, bank accounts can freeze. Take the deadline seriously and draft a considered, procedurally correct response immediately.

How does eLitigant help if it isn’t the liquidator?

Chris drafts the director’s side of the file — board minutes, the statement of affairs narrative and deficiency account, creditor circulars, decision-procedure notices and responses to demands or petitions — from your company’s own facts, structured to the standard a creditor’s solicitor or a court would expect. You then engage a licensed practitioner already organised, which is where the cost saving comes from. eLitigant does not act as office-holder and does not give legal advice. Related guides: Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) · Members’ Voluntary Liquidation (MVL) · Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) · Statement of Affairs drafting guide · Winding-up petition · Statutory demand · Director disqualification defence (CDDA) · The Director’s Liquidation & Restructuring Strategy · All civil court forms

eLitigant CIC (No. 16566612) — a community interest company. Not a law firm; you remain in control. eLitigant prepares documents from your own information; it does not give legal advice and no outcome is guaranteed. A licensed insolvency practitioner must act as office-holder; always check current fees and rules.